Key ethical challenges for healthcare workers arising from the COVID-19 pandemic are identified: isolation and social distancing, duty of care and fair access to treatment. The paper argues for a relational approach to ethics which includes solidarity, relational autonomy, duty, equity, trust and reciprocity as core values. The needs of the poor and socially disadvantaged are highlighted. Relational autonomy and solidarity are explored in relation to isolation and social distancing. Reciprocity is discussed with reference to healthcare workers’ duty of care (...) and its limits. Priority setting and access to treatment raise ethical issues of utility and equity. Difficult ethical dilemmas around triage, do not resuscitate decisions, and withholding and withdrawing treatment are discussed in the light of recently published guidelines. The paper concludes with the hope for a wider discussion of relational ethics and a glimpse of a future after the pandemic has subsided. (shrink)

Digital Health Technologies (DHTs) are currently the subject of much debate both in terms of their technological frontiers as well as their ethical, legal and societal implications (ELSI). Regulation of such technologies as medical devices currently lacks behind their level of adoption. Digital Twins are the next evolution step of such DHTs and provide an opportunity to anticipate and act on ELSI before adoption again leaps before the necessary review. This paper introduces the concept and use cases of digital twins (...) in medicine, then frames the debate through the lens of related technologies, machine learning and personalized medicine, and maps ethical challenges stemming from those. Finally, we lay out how digital twins may change and challenge the future practice of medicine. (shrink)

In a fashion that might have surprised him, Wyclif s principles of interpretation anticipate and interact with the hermeneutical reflections of our own time.

Theologians and philosophers of religion are increasingly interested in physics. From the fine-tuning of universal constants to quantum mechanics, relativity, and cosmology, physics is a surprisingly common subject where religion is involved. Bridging the gap between issues in religion and those in physics can be quite difficult, however. Fortunately, the philosophy of science provides a middle ground between the two disciplines. In this book, a philosopher of science provides a critical analysis of the ways in which physics is brought into (...) play in matters of religion. (shrink)

Pinter’s play The Caretaker explores interpersonal tensions relating to terminal illness. This paper interrogates notions of care, suffering, ownership, dignity and the consequences of active intervention and inaction in two key sections of the play: Aston’s monologue concerning his own brutal treatment (active intervention) and Davies’s final rejection by the brothers who fail to provide accommodation and care (inaction). This interprofessional analysis combines theatrical and clinical perspectives to create insights which can enhance empathy improve decision-making in end of life care (...) and can inform the education of healthcare professionals. (shrink)

Four arguments are examined in order to assess the state of the Intelligent Design debate. First, critics continually cite the fact that ID proponents have religious motivations. When used as criticism of ID arguments, this is an obvious ad hominem. Nonetheless, philosophers and scientists alike continue to wield such arguments for their rhetorical value. Second, in his expert testimony in the Dover trial, philosopher Robert Pennock used repudiated claims in order to brand ID as a kind of pseudoscience. His arguments (...) hinge on the nature of methodological naturalism as a metatheoretic shaping principle. We examine the use of such principles in science and the history of science. Special attention is given to the demarcation problem. Third, the scientific merits of ID are examined. Critics rightly demand more than promissory notes for ID to move beyond the fringe. Fourth, although methodological naturalism gets a lot of attention, there is another shaping principle to contend with, namely, conservatism. Science, like most disciplines, tends to change in an incremental rather than revolutionary manner. When ID is compared to other non- or quasi-Darwinian proposals, it appears to be a more radical solution than is needed in the face of the anomalies. (shrink)

A longstanding question at the intersection of science, philosophy, and theology is how God might act, or not, when governing the universe. Many believe that determinism would prevent God from acting at all, since to do so would require violating the laws of nature. However, when a robust view of these laws is coupled with the kind of determinism now used in dynamics, a new model of divine action emerges. This book presents a new approach to divine action beyond the (...) current focus on quantum mechanics and esoteric gaps in the causal order. It bases this approach on two general points. First, that there are laws of nature is not merely a metaphor. Second, laws and physical determinism are now understood in mathematically precise ways that have important implications for metaphysics. The explication of these two claims shows not only that nonviolationist divine action is possible, but there is considerably more freedom available for God to act than current models allow. By bringing a philosophical perspective to an issue often dominated by theologians and scientists, this text redresses an imbalance in the discussion around divine action. It will, therefore, be of keen interest to scholars of Philosophy and Religion, the Philosophy of Science, and Theology. (shrink)

This chapter considers two types of fine‐tuning, those dealing with the initial conditions of the universe and those based on fixed parameters. Three approaches have been taken to argue that fine‐tuning does not need any special explanation. The first is an appeal to coincidence. The second is that the data are biased by our own observations. The third has to do with the nature of probability itself. The chapter assesses each of these objections in detail. Many naturalistic explanations have been (...) offered for fine‐tuning. The chapter considers the three most important ones. The first is that future discoveries might show that fine‐tuning was not improbable after all. The second is that other life‐permitting ranges for the fine‐tuned constants (FTCs) might exist, allowing for exotic forms of life unlike ours. The third is that we might live in a multiverse of many different universes all with different values of FTCs. (shrink)

Theologians and philosophers have argued against an interventionist view of divine action for centuries. Although God could intervene in the natural order, they believe that God does not and will not. This chapter first considers the arguments against the traditional, interventionist view of divine action. There are five main reasons why divine intervention has come under fire in recent decades: (i) an incompetent god; (ii) a capricious or inconsistent god; (iii) the problem of evil; (iv) the god of the gaps; (...) and (v) conflicts with science. The chapter then presents a brief discussion of the laws of nature, some specific noninterventionist models, and an assessment of the most popular such model based on quantum mechanics. It ends with a reexamination of the motives for noninterventionism and a new way to understand what the fight is about. (shrink)

Theologians and philosophers of religion often look to science, especially physics, for ideas. They want to know how the world was created, how God might interact with it, and whether there are any fingerprints of divine action. This chapter considers the recent history of cosmology. Modern cosmology has never just been about science. Although Einstein's field equations for general relativity showed that the universe would expand or contract over time, that idea did not square with his philosophical views. The back (...) and forth between scholars of different disciplines pares away overstatements from real advances in scientific knowledge. It also helps make clear what the implications of physics are for matters of philosophy and religion. The chapter also presents an overview of the book and how the other chapters of the book are organized. (shrink)

Intelligent design (ID) raises several challenges for the relation between science and religion. One's views on these matters ramify across the other sciences, including physics. Can design, especially supernatural design, play any legitimate role in science? Is the ID question just a matter of evidence? What is the proper role for naturalism in all this? These are important questions in the philosophy of science. Before taking them up, this chapter briefly looks at the core concepts used in ID today. There (...) is a less visible but equally menacing problem for the viability of ID. Methodological naturalism (MN) gets a lot of attention, but there is another methodological shaping principle to be contended with, namely, conservatism. Conservatism is also the reason ID attracts so many theists and few nontheists. If one already believes in an intelligence that can play the role of designer, then ID‐based science is not a radical move. (shrink)

This chapter considers the arguments for and against reductionism and then considers its main rival: emergence. A large part of the reductionist program is generally considered a failure. Philosophers of science have been chipping away at reductionist claims for a couple of decades now. Philosopher Jaegwon Kim has been a central figure in matters of reduction, supervenience, and emergence. He presents three related puzzles for the antireductionist: causal redundancy; downward causation and causal drainage. According to the author, reduction and emergence (...) have earned a place in science and the philosophy of science. The chapter finally presents the diagnosis of the controversy between reductionists and their foes and then briefly considers some theological ramifications. (shrink)

Physics has often undermined the notion of free will, and philosophers have been concerned about this for many reasons. One is that freedom seems to be a necessary condition for moral responsibility. This chapter explains how special theory of relativity (STR) leads to the idea that there is no flow of time. It analyzes several proposals that reintroduce a classical view of time without violating relativity. The chapter suggests two ways in which the philosophy of science can add some helpful (...) perspective to the debate. It discusses how Einstein took gravity to be a geometric property of space time rather than a force and that general theory of relativity (GTR) conflicts with the Standard Model of particle physics. The chapter explains that there are several possible moves one might make in order to preserve a classical view of time. (shrink)

To understand the relation between science and religion, this chapter begins with some history. It starts with ancient Greece, tracing the influence of Aristotelian thought into the late Middle Ages. A turning point occurs in the 14th century with attacks on Aristotelian/ Thomism. This shift reverberates through Galileo, Descartes, Boyle, and the early modern era. After the overview of history, the chapter considers the overall structure of science and several models used to describe its relationship to religion. At the end, (...) the chapter describes that there is no single model that can capture the complex relation between science and religion. (shrink)

This chapter looks at approaches developed by philosophers of science that may be useful to those working in religion, theology, and the philosophy of religion. Philosophers of science have spent a lot of time thinking about how theories change, what to do with surprising data and conflicting explanations, and what to say when we need more categories than true and false. Sometimes, all this is hidden behind terms such as antirealism, paradigm, verisimilitude, and inference to the best explanation. The author (...) unpacks a bit of jargon from the philosophy of science and considers some analogies and applications to matters of religion. The chapter also presents some of the tools developed in the philosophy of science. Finally, it discusses what is supposed to be the fundamental divide between religion and science: the former is based on faith, while the latter is based on reason. (shrink)

There is an ongoing debate over cosmological fine-tuning between those holding that design is the best explanation and those who favor a multiverse. A small group of critics has recently challenged both sides, charging that their probabilistic intuitions are unfounded. If the critics are correct, then a growing literature in both philosophy and physics lacks a mathematical foundation. In this paper, I show that just such a foundation exists. Cosmologists are now providing the kinds of measure-theoretic arguments needed to make (...) the case for fine-tuning. Introduction Probability and infinite sets 2.1 No probability function 2.2 Arbitrary and wrong probability functions The measure of the universe The coarse-tuning objection Arbitrariness and error Conclusion. (shrink)

-/- Some phenomena within nature exhibit such exquisiteness of structure, function or interconnectedness that many people have found it natural—if not inescapable—to see a deliberative and directive mind behind those phenomena. The mind in question, being prior to nature itself, is typically taken to be supernatural. Philosophically inclined thinkers have both historically and at present labored to shape the relevant intuition into a more formal, logically rigorous inference. The resultant theistic arguments, in their various logical forms, share a focus on (...) plan, purpose, intention and design, and are thus classified as teleological arguments (or, frequently, as arguments from or to design). -/- Although enjoying some prominent defenders over the centuries, such arguments have also attracted serious criticisms from a number of major historical and contemporary thinkers. Both critics and advocates are found not only among philosophers, but come from scientific and other disciplines as well. In the following discussion, major variant forms of teleological arguments will be distinguished and explored, traditional philosophical and other criticisms will be discussed, and the most prominent contemporary turns (cosmic fine tuning arguments, many-worlds theories, and the present Intelligent Design debate) will be tracked. Discussion will conclude with a brief look at one historically important non-inferential approach to the issue. (shrink)

Scientific knowledge is not merely a matter of reconciling theories and laws with data and observations. Science presupposes a number of metatheoretic shaping principles in order to judge good methods and theories from bad. Some of these principles are metaphysical (e.g., the uniformity of nature) and some are methodological (e.g., the need for repeatable experiments). While many shaping principles have endured since the scientific revolution, others have changed in response to conceptual pressures both from within science and without. Many of (...) them have theistic roots. For example, the notion that nature conforms to mathematical laws flows directly from the early modern presupposition that there is a divine Lawgiver. This interplay between theism and shaping principles is often unappreciated in discussions about the relation between science and religion. Today, of course, naturalists reject the influence of theism and prefer to do science on their terms. But as Robert Koons and Alvin Plantinga have argued, this is more difficult than is typically assumed. In particular, they argue, metaphysical naturalism is in conflict with several metatheoretic shaping principles, especially explanatory virtues such as simplicity and with scientific realism more broadly. These arguments will be discussed as well as possible responses. In the end, theism is able to provide justification for the philosophical foundations of science that naturalism cannot. (shrink)

A recent noninterventionist account of divine agency has been proposed that marries the probabilistic nature of quantum mechanics to the instability of chaos theory. On this account, God is able to bring about observable effects in the macroscopic world by determining the outcome quantum events. When this determination occurs in the presence of chaos, the ability to influence large systems is multiplied. This paper argues that although the proposal is highly intuitive, current research in dynamics shows that it is far (...) less plausible than previously thought. Chaos coupled to quantum mechanics proves to be a shaky foundation for models of divine agency. (shrink)

Działanie Boga a prawa przyrody: odpowiedź Łukasiewiczowi W odpowiedzi Łukasiewiczowi na Opatrzność Boża a przypadek w świecie bronię trzech wniosków. Po pierwsze, stanowisko nazwane przez niego „deizmem epistemicznym” staje przed wyzwaniami ze strony fizyki, których często się nie zauważa. Po drugie, jeśli teiści opowiadający się za argumentem celowościowym opartym na tzw. delikatnym dostrojeniu nie mają racji, to nie ma jej również większość fizyków, która uważa, że delikatne dostrojenie wymaga wyjaśnienia. Po trzecie, nie wszystkie prawa przyrody są warunkowe w takim sensie, (...) jaki przyjmuje Łukasiewicz. Na szczęście rozróżnienie między prawami a nienomologiczną informacją pozwala na rozszerzenie jego modelu działania Boga. (shrink)

For quantum mechanics to form the crux of a robust model of divine action, random quantum fluctuations must be amplified into the macroscopic realm. What has not been recognized in the divine action literature to date is the degree to which differential dynamics, continuum mechanics, and condensed matter physics prevent such fluctuations from infecting meso- and macroscopic systems. Once all of the relevant physics is considered, models of divine action based on quantum randomness are shown to be far more limited (...) than is generally assumed. Unless some sort of new physical mechanism is discovered, the amplification problem cannot be solved. (shrink)

This study investigates the differences in individuals'' ethical decision making between Canadian university business students and accounting professionals. We examine the differences in three measures known to be important in the ethical decision-making process: ethical awareness, ethical orientation, and intention to perform questionable acts. We tested for differences in these three measures in eight different questionable actions among three groups: students starting business studies, those in their final year of university, and professional accountants.The measures of awareness capture the extent to (...) which respondents felt that a particular action was unethical according to each of several ethical criteria. We found few differences between the two student groups on these measures, suggesting that their education had minimal effect on raising their awareness of the ethical issues in the vignettes. Indeed, overall, the graduating student''s scores were marginally lower than those of the entry-level students. However, the professionals viewed some actions as significantly less ethical than did the graduating students. (shrink)

The use of idealized models in science is by now well-documented. Such models are typically constructed in a “top-down” fashion: starting with an intractable theory or law and working down toward the phenomenon. This view of model-building has motivated a family of confirmation schemes based on the convergence of prediction and observation. This paper considers how chaotic dynamics blocks the convergence view of confirmation and has forced experimentalists to take a different approach to model-building. A method known as “phase space (...) reconstruction” not only reveals a lacuna in the philosophical literature on models, it also fails to conform to conventional views about how models are used to confirm a theory. (shrink)

In his recent book, Explaining Chaos, Peter Smith presents a new problem in the foundations of chaos theory. Specifically, he argues that the standard ways of justifying idealizations in mathematical models fail when it comes to the infinite intricacy found in strange attractors. I argue that Smith's analysis undermines much of the explanatory power of chaos theory. A better approach is developed by drawing analogies from the models found in continuum mechanics.

This paper continues a dialogue that began with an article by Jeffrey Koperski entitled “Two Bad Ways to Attack Intelligent Design and Two Good Ones,” published in the June 2008 issue of Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science. In a response article, Christopher Pynes argues that ad hominem arguments are sometimes legitimate, especially when critiquing Intelligent Design (2012). We show that Pynes’s examples only apply to matters of testimony, not the kinds of arguments found in the best defenses (...) of ID. (shrink)

In “Koperski’s New (Improved?) Decretalism,” Robert Larmer argues that my version of nomological realism about the laws of nature logically entails occasionalism. Here I clarify and defend my view against this charge. The main disagreement is whether a proper account of the laws of nature must involve dynamic production—what is commonly called oomph.

One of the main arguments against interventionist views of special divine action is that God would not violate his own laws. But if intervention entails the breaking of natural law, what precisely is being broken? While the nature of the laws of nature has been widely explored by philosophers of science, important distinctions are often ignored in the science and religion literature. In this paper, I consider the three main approaches to laws: Humean anti-realism, supervenience on more fundamental aspects of (...) metaphysics, and nomological realism. The first denies that there is any metaphysical reality behind laws or causation. The second holds that laws supervene on capacities, dispositions, or counterfactuals. The third takes laws to be irreducible aspects of reality. The mechanics of special divine action and worries about intervention vary depending on which view of law one holds. In the end, I argue that early modern natural philosophers, who first introduced law-language for nature, largely had it right. Laws are not created entities or powers that act as intermediaries between God and nature; they are best understood as expressions of God’s will for nature. The outstanding question is whether such a view inevitably lands in occasionalism. (shrink)

Reidenbach and Robin (1988, 1990) proposed and refined a multidimensional ethics scale. This study replicates and extends their work by examining the generalizability of the scale beyond marketing to accounting, and to subjects from across the United States and other countries. Results indicate that, in general, the scale holds for this different sample and context. However, an additional utilitarian construct emerged in the current study as important for accounting academics in their ethical decision-making. We also found that when we refined (...) Reidenbach and Robin's measure of intention to make a particular choice, a social desirability bias or halo effect was identified. Methodological implications for business ethics research are also presented. (shrink)

While scientists sometimes make light of philosophy, science relies on a variety of philosophical assumptions, such as the idea that there are laws of nature. Many of these arose during the Scientific Revolution with the rejection of Aristotelianism. Here we consider the theological motivations behind several key examples. While science is now officially naturalistic, its rise depended in part on theology.

In his recent anthology, Intelligent Design Creationism and Its Critics, Robert Pennock continues his attack on what he considers to be the pseudoscience of Intelligent Design Theory. In this critical review, I discuss the main issues in the debate. Although the rhetoric is often heavy and the articles are intentionally stacked against Intelligent Design, there are many interesting topics in the philosophy of science to be found. I conclude that, contra Pennock, there is nothing intrinsically unscientific about Intelligent Design. At (...) this stage, however, it remains more of a provocative idea than a research program. Whether design theorists can bridge this gap is still very much in question. In any case, the debate serves as a modern case study for such classic problems as the nature of scientific explanations, theory change, the demarcation problem, and the role of metaphysical assumptions in the development of science. (shrink)

The word “model” is highly ambiguous, and there is no uniform terminology used by either scientists or philosophers. Here, a model is considered to be a representation of some object, behavior, or system that one wants to understand. This article presents the most common type of models found in science as well as the different relations—traditionally called “analogies”—between models and between a given model and its subject. Although once considered merely heuristic devices, they are now seen as indispensable to modern (...) science. There are many different types of models used across the scientific disciplines, although there is no uniform terminology to classify them. The most familiar are physical models such as scale replicas of bridges or airplanes. These, like all models, are used because of their “analogies” to the subjects of the models. A scale model airplane has a structural similarity or “material analogy” to the full scale version. This correspondence allows engineers to infer dynamic properties of the airplane based on wind tunnel experiments on the replica. Physical models also include abstract representations which often include idealizations such as frictionless planes and point masses. Another, but completely different type of model, is constituted by sets of equations. These mathematical models were not always deemed legitimate models by philosophers. Model-to-subject and model-to-model relations are described using several different types of analogies: positive, negative, neutral, material, and formal. (shrink)

Creationism is usually paired these days with evolution, as in “The Creation vs. Evolution Debate.” Although there is something right about that, it is not the whole story. The controversy is older than Darwin and touches on far more than biological evolution. In this chapter, we consider broader questions about the origin of the universe and the relation between science and Scripture: How old is the universe? If God created it, how did he do so? How should we interpret the (...) account of creation in the early chapters of Genesis? There are four main approaches to these questions. The first is naturalism: nothing exists beyond the realm of nature, material objects, and energy. Most naturalists consider religious beliefs to be purely matters of faith, making no contribution to history or science. Although naturalism and atheism are not synonymous, when it comes to matters of religion, they are essentially the same. The second view is young earth creationism (YEC), which takes a literal interpretation of Genesis and the six days of creation. The last two views, progressive creationism (PC) and theistic evolution (TE), reject this interpretation and agree with contemporary science about the age of the universe. The difference between PC and TE has to do with God’s activities after the initial creation of the cosmos. Although there are nonchristian theists in each camp, the debate is a much larger, defining issue among contemporary, Protestant Christians than it is in other religions. (shrink)

This open access book addresses the question of how God can providentially govern apparently ungovernable randomness. Medieval theologians confidently held that God is provident, that is, God is the ultimate cause of or is responsible for everything that happens. However, scientific advances since the 19th century pose serious challenges to traditional views of providence. From Darwinian evolution to quantum mechanics, randomness has become an essential part of the scientific worldview. An interdisciplinary team of Muslim, Christian and Jewish scholars—biologists, physicists, philosophers (...) and theologians—addresses questions of randomness and providence. (shrink)

In his recent anthology, Intelligent Design Creationism and Its Critics, Robert Pennock continues his attack on what he considers to be the pseudoscience of Intelligent Design Theory. In this critical review, I discuss the main issues in the debate. Although the volume’s rhetoric is often heavy and the articles are intentionally stacked against Intelligent Design, it touches upon many interesting topics in the philosophy of science. I conclude that, contra Pennock, there is nothing intrinsically unscientific about Intelligent Design. At this (...) stage, however, it remains more of a provocative idea than a research program. Whether design theorists can bridge this gap is still very much in question. In any case, the debate serves as a case study for such classic problems as the nature of scientific explanations, theory change, the demarcation problem, and the role of metaphysical assumptions in the development of science. (shrink)

Scientific knowledge is often categorized as experimental or theoretical. There is, however, a third layer where philosophy of science and science proper overlap, the realm of metatheoretic shaping principles. For example, we assume that the causal regularities observed today will also hold tomorrow. Researchers are thereby relying on two metaphysical doctrines: the uniformity of nature and mechanistic causation. There are also the “explanatory virtues” of simplicity, testability, internal and external coherence, fruitfulness, and wide scope. My first goal is to categorize (...) these principles and show how they’ve operated in the history of science. Particular attention will be paid to their suspension and rejection, even of widely held principles. My second goal is to consider how certain shaping principles impinge on open theology. Of particular interest will be naturalism (both metaphysical and methodological), reductionism, and realism. Surprisingly, differences within the open theology camp are more relevant to these issues than open theism itself. (shrink)

This best-selling anthology of readings with case studies provides insightful and comprehensive treatment of ethical issues in medicine. Appropriate for courses taught in philosophy departments, bioethics programs, as well as schools of medicine and nursing, the collection covers such provocative topics as biomedical enhancement, clinical trials in developing countries, animal research, physician-assisted suicide, and health care reform. The text's effective pedagogical features include chapter introductions, argument sketches, explanations of medical terms, headnotes, and annotated bibliographies.

A many-worlds interpretation is of quantum mechanics tells us that the linear equations of motion are the true and complete laws for the time-evolution of every physical system and that the usual quantum-mechanical states provide complete descriptions of all possible physical situations. Such an interpretation, however, denies the standard way of understanding quantum-mechanical states. When the pointer on a measuring device is in a superposition of pointing many different directions, for example, we are to understand this as many pointers, each (...) in a differentworld, each pointing in a different determinate direction. We ask here whether such talk makes any genuinely intelligible sense of the term world. We conclude that it does not. (shrink)

Stawarczyk, Bezdek, and Zacks offer neuroscience evidence for a midline default network core, which appears to coordinate internal, top‐down mentation with externally‐triggered, bottom‐up attention in a push‐pull relationship. The network may enable the flexible pursuance of thoughts tuned into or detached from the current environment.

What effect does witnessing other students cheat have on one's own cheating behavior? What roles do moral attitudes and neutralizing attitudes (justifications for behavior) play when deciding to cheat? The present research proposes a model of academic dishonesty which takes into account each of these variables. Findings from experimental (vignette) and survey methods determined that seeing others cheat increases cheating behavior by causing students to judge the behavior less morally reprehensible, not by making rationalization easier. Witnessing cheating also has unique (...) effects, controlling for other variables. (shrink)

We survey the development of “California Phenomenology”, both as a philosophical movement originating with Dagfinn Føllesdal’s formulation of a Fregean, analytic reading of Husserl in the late 1950s and 1960s, and as an evolving network of philosophers working throughout California, who have met under the auspices of several groups in a more or less continuous way since that time. We trace the history of these groups in detail, provide an overview of debates that occurred between “West Coast” approaches to Husserlian (...) phenomenology and other approaches, and survey the broad panorama of more recent work. (shrink)